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BREAKING UP IS HARD TO DO – REVISITED: REFLECTIONS ON BREXIT AND 
THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF SLOEXIT 
James Gow, King’s College London and Ernst Dijxhoorn, Leiden University 
In February 2016, Sir Paul Coleridge, a former High Court judge, made news headlines by 
saying that a ‘high proportion’ of divorced couples regretted their separation five years on. 
He counselled those contemplating a split to think twice and suggested that marriage break-
down was the ‘scourge of society’ and cost the taxpayer ‘billions.’  He cited research con1 -
ducted by his law firm Seddons that only 20 per cent of divorcees were completely happy 
with their decision and, at the other end of the scale, 22 per wished they had not parted ways 
after five years  (already lower than the 50 per cent in an earlier, similar, but larger US study 2
that found 50 per cent wishing they had not gone their own ways after a few years ). That 20 3
per cent and the judge’s own view that sometimes divorce was ‘inevitable’ and clearly the 
best path for the parties, of course, does not mean that dissociation should never be contem-
plated. But, following Sir Paul’s caution – and echoing the immortal words of Neil Sedaka 
and the Righteous Brothers – those thinking about it should reflect that ‘breaking up is hard 
to do.’ This was a reflection that the older one of the authors had already offered a quarter of 
a century ago regarding the looming and historic demise of another intergovernmental union 
of sovereign states, in which some of those states were heading for the exit: Yugoslavia and 
the case of Sloexit,  which marked its 25th Anniversary, at almost the same moment the UK 4
referendum on independence was held in June 2016. 
The dissolution of Yugoslavia was the end of a union where, in constitutional theory, the ex-
 Victoria Derbyshire Show BBC 8 February 2016, available at www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p03hw;tt accessed 1
19 March 2016; The Daily Mail 9 February 2016.
 Seddons, Getting a divorce? You could regret it in five years time available at https://www.seddons.co.uk/2
NewsInsight/News/2016-02-09/Getting-divorce-You-could-regret-that-in-5-years-time/
  The Daily Mail 18 August 2014.3
 We use this term consciously to link the notion of Brexit with the exit of Slovenia from the Socialist Federa4 -
tive Republic of Yugoslavia. We understand that some Slovenes used this term regarding the idea that Slovenia 
might withdraw from the European Union, itself - and that there has been, to date, little support for that idea. 
(Delo 4 July 2016) We recognise that this might cause some potential confusion, but judge that this would be 
minimal and, after consulting with colleagues in Slovenia, have decided to use this term, because of its effect.
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ercise of sovereign rights had been transferred to the union and from which some members 
wished to return the exercise of those rights, with Slovenia leading the way.  The fracturing 5
of that union ran counter to the general global and, particularly, European trend at the time 
towards greater integration, most notably as diplomacy on Yugoslavia’s disunion famously 
overlapped with agreement to form the European Union at the Maastricht Summit of Euro-
pean Community leaders, in December 1992. Over a quarter of a century on, it is that Euro-
pean Union that faces the prospect of dismemberment, as the UK heads for the new world 
labelled ‘Brexit’. The British discussion about sovereignty and reclaiming the exercise of 
sovereign rights recalls the similar assertions of Slovenia in that earlier episode, whatever the 
substantive differences between the cases. In principle, it might be useful to use the prism of 
Slovenia’s experience after the Yugoslav break-up to reflect on the question of the UK’s leav-
ing the European Union and how Sir Paul’s warnings about divorce might relate to that de-
bate. Are there considerations emanating from Slovenia’s independence that might cast light 
on the prospects for ‘Brexit?’ To be able to answer this, of course, we need to know what was 
the impact of independence on Slovenia? This is a question that surprisingly seems to have 
been little posed and even less addressed in the years since it happened. One purpose of the 
present article is to assess the impact of leaving Yugoslavia on Slovenia — a necessary basis 
for examining how Slovenia’s experience might inform that of the UK. 
We begin by addressing the nature of our enquiry, setting out that which it does not purport 
to be — but, perhaps, might otherwise be assumed to be — from the approach we take, and 
considering the value of our enterprise and its limitations. We then continue by identifying 
elements in the conditions and context that generated independence, as well as the dynamics 
that accompanied assertions of sovereignty, which may provide some elements that align the 
Slovenian and British cases, and, offer comparable (but, by no means identical) features that 
allow fruitful extrapolation from one to the other - that is, the ‘why’ in this exercise. We then 
offer an assessment of the economic and social impact of independence on Slovenia. Finally, 
we conclude that separation is, indeed, hard and can bring considerable pain, as well as being 
subject to international strategic circumstances – but, that it is also survivable and can allow 
 James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav Crisis (New York: Co5 -
lumbia University Press, 1997, pp.67-77.
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beneficial development. 
The Approach 
In the present article, we seek to assess the impact on Slovenia of leaving Yugoslavia, in the 
illustrative context of Brexit and how Slovenia’s experience might indicate (not predict) that 
which awaits the UK as it negotiates its way out of the EU – notwithstanding the significant 
differences between the two situations, which are notable and warrant cautions and caveats. 
Below, we point to similarities and differences between the situations of the UK and the EU 
and Slovenia and the SFRY. It would be a mistake (as an otherwise friendly anonymous re-
viewer of the article appeared to do) to see the analysis as a narrowly-drawn, tight compari-
son. Indeed, it is not a comparison. It is an allusive projection. There are features that ‘line 
up’ and make the situations comparable, which are, sufficient for our study. But, the study 
does not — and cannot — compare the cases, as one is in the past, and the other is emerging, 
aside from any other consideration. We offer an argument interpretively extrapolating from 
one situation in the past to one that is current, based on those key points of commonality, 
while recognising that the situations differ in many other respects, but these do not inhibit 
our analysis. This is a study that seeks to use those particular similarities as a departure point. 
In doing so, we try to be careful not to overstate any of the features, in either direction. 
We are well aware of the major, even, profound, divergences between Slovenia under com-
munism and the UK in the European Union. However, while even these would not preclude 
an exercise in comparison (one of the key achievements of comparative politics has been to 
conceptualise and identify features of polities to enable such comparison,  ours, as stated, is 6
not a comparative study and, more saliently, those points of divergence do not significantly 
impinge on our mission. There were big differences — which we discuss below. But, these 
do not impair the positive focus on key features that allow the kind of indicative analytical 
extrapolation we propose. The key issue is that the points of alignment allow us to use the 
prism of Slovenia’s experience to inform understanding of Brexit. 
 For pioneering studies in the field of comparative politics, introducing the categories and concepts that allow 6
comparison across different types of polity, see Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr., Comparative 
Politics: System, Process and Policy Boston: Little Brown, 1978; see also Gabriel A. Almond (ed.) Compara-
tive Politics Today: A World View Boston: Little Brown, 1974.
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This is not - and should not be considered to be - a piece of hard-edged political-economic 
analysis. It is more an historical essay, informed by politics and philosophy, inter alia. It does 
not purport to offer a scientific (or pseudo-scientific) projection. In that respect, there is no 
sense that we are offering a predictive model - and certainly not one based on crunched 
numbers in sophisticated quantitative modelling. Rather than being predictive, it is more in-
dicative, based on an attempt to interpret carefully and sensibly from one situation to another. 
It offers a perspective, treating an event in the past with another event sharing some similar 
characteristics, and investigates that which might cast light from one to the other. As a piece 
of scholarly research, it is a ‘think piece’, closer to the work of historians and political 
philosophers than it is to that of hardened political, economic or social scientists. Our analy-
sis is an illustration drawn from reason and interpretation of evidence, not, as already noted, 
from statistical (or similar) processing. While we would not claim the greatness, say, of Ed-
mund Burke,  we would highlight the allusion to his great political study in our title to indi7 -
cate an approach founded in observations of political phenomena and  rational intellectual 
consideration and judgement of them. 
Conditions, Contexts and Dynamics 
There are clear similarities in the conditions and contexts in which arguments about separa-
tion emerged. Most notably, these include the impact of economic crisis and demographic 
change, and also the dynamics of dispute, as assertions of sovereignty engendered counter-
assertions of sovereignty. These are discussed in the present section. In terms of similarity, 
there are three key points of similarity between the European Union and the Socialist Federa-
tive Republic of Yugoslavia, which dissolved in 1991,  begetting a protracted, large-scale 8
armed conflict, as well as notable divergences. First, one of the more significant parallels 
with the EU is the confederal character of Yugoslavia. In both instances, in theoretical and 
 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, Ed. Conor Cruise O’Brien, London: Pelican, 1976.7
 James Gow has written extensively on the dissolution of Yugoslavia and its aftermath, as well as on a range of 8
international security issues, including UK security, the EU and NATO. Parts of the present analysis draw on 
that extensive research, including Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav Crisis 
London: Hurst and Co., 1997 and James Gow and Cathie Carmichael, Slovenia and the Slovenes: a Small 
Country in the New Europe London: Hurst, 2010.
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formal terms, the exercise of sovereign rights had been transferred to the centre of a union of 
states, a centre to which a bureaucracy pertained.  This leads to the second clear parallel, 9
which is the legal-political quality of sovereignty (‘sovereignty’ is assumed, at this point, and 
discussed below). Under the 1974 Constitution, the federation was based on the sovereignty 
of the states (Article 3) (which quality set the latter apart from the autonomous provinces 
(Article 4)). Finally, politically, both forms of union embracing member states had a collec-
tive inter-governmental ‘governing’ body — the European Council, in the EU, and the Col-
lective Presidency in federal Yugoslavia (the latter also including representation from the two 
autonomous provinces in Serbia). The collective Yugoslav Presidency was, in broad, but sig-
nificant, terms, an analogue for the European Council in the context of the EU – indeed, in 
the celebrated BBC documentary series The Death of Yugoslavia, for simplicity, this ana-
logue was used as shorthand. This intergovernmental council made decisions on behalf of the 
union, reflecting the positions of the member states.  10
While the parallels should not be overdrawn, taken together, these elements reveal compara-
ble contexts: a state asserting its sovereignty in the context of a confederal arrangement in-
volving an inter-governmental council, in which, in constitutional theory (and as already not-
ed), the exercise of some sovereign rights had been transferred to the whole; and. after claim-
ing back the exercise of those rights and asserting them, the sovereign states in question be-
came independent. In this frame, the substantive differences between Slovenia and the UK 
do not matter — neither their histories, nor the type of polity, nor formal and constitutional 
basis of sovereignty. It is the effects of a sovereign actor’s leaving and disentangling itself 
from a confederal, inter-governmental union that matters. 
It is necessary, of course, none the less, to be aware of those and other important differences 
between Slovenia’s situation and Britain’s position, even though these do not impinge signif-
icantly on the indicative extrapolation in the present analysis. Four differences should be 
noted, in particular. First, the ‘socialist’ Yugoslav Federation was a set of one-party states 
 For further detail on these issues, see Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, pp.13-20 and 67-77, especially, p.76.9
 There was also a weak government in the Federation, the Federal Executive Council, which perhaps had 10
some parallels with the European Commission – although this analogy should not be stretched too far given the 
communist party role.
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(until the very final phases), not the liberal democracies of the EU.  Slovenia was incubated 11
as a state under communism and in the Yugoslav context, from the 1940s onwards, having 
had no previous history of statehood.  In contrast, the UK, the ‘mother’ of democracies, had 12
had centuries of evolving statehood, even before the formal creation of the ‘United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Ireland’ (later ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) 
in 1801.  However, neither the maturity of statehood, nor the characteristics of one-party 13
rule versus liberal pluralism, make a significant difference regarding the exit from the supra-
national framework. Indeed, it might be observed that both exits were propelled by a populist 
groundswell of opinion, rejecting the encompassing framework and asserting sovereign 
rights and claims, which opinion was focused in the holding of referenda. Arguably, this 
made both cases a product of democratic will, which expression, for present analytical pur-
pose, effectively wipes away the core differences in the character of the polities. The con-
trasting character of the polities, therefore, has limited bearing on the questions of separation, 
although the differences in referendum drivers and outcome might prompt a further question. 
The second notable difference, therefore, concerns the drivers of the sovereignty referenda. 
In both Slovenia and the UK, the holding of a referendum was a common and vital factor in 
the move for independence. Both referenda were on the question of leaving the wider union. 
However, their drivers and results were quite distinct — although, in each, the outcome was 
a populist vote for separation. The Slovenian independence referendum occurred in the con-
text of one-party rule adjusting to pluralism, and as a clearly defensive, self-protective asser-
tion of sovereignty, intended to demonstrate Slovenian unity and to bolster it. By contrast, 
the UK referendum was almost an accident, with a narrow origin in divisive and divided 
Conservative Party politics, which situation was a partial reflection of cross-cutting and non-
party divisions within the country. 
 On the consolidation of one-party authority in the Yugoslav states, see the inestimable Dennison I. Rusinow, 11
The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-74 London: Hurst and Co., 1977.
 James Gow and Cathie Carmichael, Slovenia and the Slovenes: a Small State in the New Europe,, London: 12
Hurst, 2010
 Simon Schama, A History of Britain, London: BBC, 200013
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In the Slovenian case, leader Milan Kučan, threatened by extra-Slovenian forces, used the 
referendum to generate unity and to protect his own position, defending himself and Slove-
nia. British Prime Minister David Cameron first said that a referendum would be held in the 
next parliament if his Party held a majority, but he did so in a context where no one expected 
that the Conservatives would win a majority. He did so as a measure to quieten the sharp di-
visions within his party about EU membership and to stave off the growing electoral pressure 
on his party from the UK Independence Party (UKIP), looking as though it could take sup-
port from the right-wing of the Conservatives. Intended as a gesture to quell dissent in the 
Conservative Party (that he believed would never actually happen, but would be won, if it 
did actually happen),  Cameron was obliged to hold the referendum, when, to general sur14 -
prise, he won the 2015 General Election. Whereas the Slovenian referendum was about 
showing unity, the British one was about tackling division. These differences had evident 
consequences in the referendum results: Slovenia’s showed resounding homogeneity and re-
inforced the case for separation; Britain’s, while having a clear majority, effectively con-
firmed the almost 50-50 divisions within the country on EU membership, leaving a contest-
ed, confused and weak foundation for those charged with taking separation forward. Yet, de-
spite these strong differences in detail, it is evident that, in both cases, a referendum turbo-
charged the independence cause and that in both cases it reinforced and focused sovereignty 
as the core question in arguments (as discussed below). 
Thirdly, while the EU was built democratically, bottom up and never had an authoritative 
unifying figure (which is not to say that particular individuals were not important intellectu-
ally, or politically, in its genesis), the Yugoslav Federation, while confederal and reflecting 
the will of its constituent states, had a top and centre in its formation and its binding, espe-
cially in the lifetime of President for Life Josip Broz Tito. 
Finally, a major difference lies in the existence of a federal armed force – the Yugoslav Peo-
ples’ Army (JNA), the more professional and better-equipped part of a two-tier defence sys-
t e m , w i t h t h e o t h e r t i e r r e s t i n g w i t h t h e s t a t e s . 
 The Cameron Years, by Steve Richards, Part 1, BBC Radio 4, 10 January 2018, available at https://www.b14 -
bc.co.uk/programmes/b09kxt2g accessed at 4 March 2018.
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Clearly, the absence of anything like a European army purporting to represent the interests of 
the union and being prepared to use force, even in a hesitant and confused manner, let alone 
a stronger and more directed conspiratorial one, makes the pattern of centripetal and cen-
trifugal forces quite different.  
While these differences are well noted, collectively, their limitations are considerably out-
weighed by each of three strong points of comparability: economic strengths and benefits; 
demographics and migration; and, most of all, sovereignty. The first significant broad simi-
larity between the British and Slovenian ’exits’ lies in economic sphere and sharp con-
tentions about reform. In the 1980s, there was a big economic divide between Slovenia and 
other parts of the South Slav union. The Slovenian economy was relatively autonomous, with 
most raw materials sourced in the country itself or internationally, with only 1.6 per cent 
stemming from other Yugoslav lands.  It was by far the strongest and most modernised of 15
the Yugoslav economies, historically and in the context of the Yugoslav federation, already 
producing 20 per cent of Yugoslav GDP in the first decade after 1945 (with well under 10 per 
cent of the total population).  Liberalising and modernising policies in the 1960s and 1970s 16
saw the Slovenian economy boom, establishing at the dominant element in the pan-Yugoslav 
economic context and the motor of extra-Yugoslav exports, contributing over one fifth of the 
total (with 8.8 per cent of the Yugoslav population).  Indeed, only 21.2 per cent of sales 17
went to the other five Yugoslav states,  while Slovenia contributed over a fifth of the Yu18 -
goslav federation’s exports. As the wealthiest and strongest economy, its national per capita 
income had risen to 200 per cent of the Yugoslav average by 1988, while it dropped to 24 per 
cent in Kosovo, the poorest of the Yugoslav territories.  Slovenia was the only net contribu19 -
 Milica Zarkovic Bookman, ‘The Economic Basis of Regional Autarchy in Yugoslavia’, Soviet Studies, Vol.15
42, No.1, January 1990, p.100.
 Jože Prinčič, Slovenska Industrija v Jugoslovenskem Primežu, 1945-1956, Novo Mesto: Tiskarna Novo 16
Mesto-Dolenjska Založba, Seidlove Zbirka,  vo.2 1992, pp.8-9.
 John Allcock, ‘The Economy’ in Gareth Wyn Jones ed. Eastern Europe and the CIS, London: Europa, 1996, 17
p.731; Milan Cviki, Evan Kraft and Milan Vodopivec, The Costs and Benefits of Slovenian Independence, 
Working Paper , WPS 1126, Washington, DC: The World Bank, April 1993, p.2.
 Mladina, 8 December 1989.18
 Cviki, Costs and Benefits, p.2.19
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tor to Yugoslav ‘redistribution’ funds to encourage economic development and modernisa-
tion.  These divergences became critical issues as macro-economic crisis descended in the 20
1980s and sharp political differences emerged. This severely impeded modernisation, re-
structuring, and market reforms that were necessary and was a dominant issue driving Slove-
nia’s independence. 
By the late 1980s, much of the growth brought by ‘warm breezes from booming economies’ 
in Europe had ended and gone into reverse as the warm breezes of growth turned chill in face 
of world recession.  Reform was required. The price of reform was extremely high and the 21
reluctance, or political inability, of mainly southern Yugoslav governments to pay the price in 
terms of the critical challenge to their legitimacy and rule added to the depth of the crisis. 
The northern states in Yugoslavia, Slovenia (in particular) and Croatia began to view their 
southern confederates as economically sick and ailing. This perception led them to conclude 
that they would be better off divorced from those failing economies. For Slovenia, full inde-
pendence ‘became the “emergency exit” condition for macro-economic stabilization, supply 
side restructuring, and systemic transition’.  This made the potential benefits of indepen22 -
dence seem considerably to outweigh the possible deficits.  
Similarly, many advocating UK independence pointed to the benefit they believed the UK 
would gain by separating formally from basket-case ruined economies, which were struc-
turally divergent and believed, in some way, to be holding the UK back.  Just as in the 23
Slovenia-Yugoslav case, there were many arguments about the way in which the EU was said 
to hinder the UK and the amount that the UK paid into the Union. While the UK could not be 
said to dominate the EU economically in the way Slovenia did in the Yugoslav context, it had 
 Cviki, Costs and Benefits, pp.3-5.20
 Žarko Lazarević, ‘Economic History of Twentieth-Century Slovenia’ in Jill Benderley and Evan Kraft  (eds), 21
Independent Slovenia: Origins, Movements and Prospects, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994, p.61.
 Jože Mencinger, ‘Costs and Benefits of Secession’ in Danica Fink-Hafner and John R. Robbins (eds), Mak22 -
ing a New Nation: the Formation of Slovenia, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997, p.205.
 This is a perspective that was expressed, mutatis mutandis, on an almost weekly basis by Michael Portillo, 23
former MP and government minister, in his role as political commentator on This Week, a political review mag-
azine broadcast each Thursday on BBC1 in the UK, when the UK parliament was sitting.
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the second largest economy (at 16 per cent of EU GDP, after Germany’s 21 per cent ) and 24
made the second largest net contribution to the EU (also after Germany, and one of only 5 
out of 28 EU Member States to make a net contribution), in 2015-16, on the eve of the Brexit 
referendum.  UK exports were more extensively locked into the EU than Slovenia’s had 25
been to Yugoslavia, at 48 per cent (meaning the costs of exit would likely be sharply more 
severe than the costs of separation were for Slovenia) — but, this still left a considerable 
wider export profile.  Over a number of years, the UK — including strong supporters of the 26
EU — had pushed for budgetary, regulatory and economic reform, while resisting the push 
from the centre and from several member states for ‘ever closer union.’  The failure to gain 27
enough in the way of reform, especially on internal movement of people, was a factor in the 
perceived failure in David Cameron’s efforts to have a deal ahead of holding the referendum 
on EU membership.  While the situations were not strictly the same, there was a strong par28 -
allel in the field of economic tensions and failed attempts at reform, which underpinned de-
bates about going a separate way. 
Secondly, the issues of migration and demographic change – which occurred against the 
background of economic dislocation, anyway – present a major parallel. The economic col-
lapse in Yugoslavia, mixed with other demographic trends, resulted in very high unemploy-
ment in the threadbare economies of the south. This major demographic pressure was com-
pounded by the ‘internal’ migration the union made possible. Largely unskilled labour 
moved from the poorer and less developed states and territories to Slovenia in search of em-
ployment as economic growth boomed in the 1960s and 1970s, with the net effect that, the 
Eurost, ‘Share of Member States in EU Budget’, 10 April 2017,http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-24
eurostat-news/-/DDN-20170410-1 accessed at 7 March 2018.
 Steven Ayres and Philip Brien, UK Funding from the EU, House of Commons Briefing Paper, No.7847, Jan25 -
uary 2018, p.4 (Fig.1), citing the European Commission’s ‘EU Financial Report 2015 and 2016.’
 Office of National Statistics, ‘Who Does the UK Trade With?’ 3 January 2018, available at https://visual.on26 -
s.gov.uk/uk-trade-partners/ accessed 7 March 2018.
 EU Observer, 10 February 2016, available at https://euobserver.com/political/132204 accessed at 7 March 27
2018.
 The Cameron Years, Part 1.28
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proportion of ethnic Slovenes fell from 96 per cent in the 1950s to 88 per cent by 1991.  29
While these ‘guest workers’, as they were seen, were needed, there were socio-economic and 
ethnic tensions, with resentment at inward migration. It did not matter that this migration 
benefitted the economy by filling vacancies and ensuring robustness and productivity. It be-
came a major, though distorting, factor in the political equation, with Slovene attitudes cap-
tured in the quasi-racist comments offered across the balcony by an ethnic Slovene to his 
Bosnian Muslim (or Bosniak, as usage changed in the 1990s) neighbour in the highly suc-
cessful film Kajmak in Marmelada (2003), by Branko Djurić — the title of the film repre-
sents cultures that do not mix, with Kajmak, a thick, creamy food somewhere between butter 
and cheese, represents the immigrant Bosnian culture, and jam represents the host Slovene 
culture. Although set in the post-independence era, the film reflects historic attitudes, which 
continue to see non-Slovenes face ‘widespread prejudice and hidden discrimination.’   In 30
the context of the UK and the EU, the ‘inward’ migration of citizens from other member 
states was a factor statistically melded with the visual and physical challenge thrust on all 
EU member states by the mix of refugees from Syria and other war zones, and economic mi-
grants from those same regions and Africa, entering Europe often illegally on a scale of de-
mographic displacement only paralleled by the Second World War.  Intra-EU migration was 31
surely beneficial to the UK economy and, aside from small pockets of minor social distortion 
requiring bridge-building, such as around Wrexham in north Wales,  completely absorbable. 32
Yet, statistically, it appeared as evidence of the government’s inability to ‘control’ migration, 
which statistical inability was somewhat fallaciously, if not disingenuously, fused into the 
need for a response to the pressing migration crisis affecting every EU member state. 
 Popis 2002. Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, Census of population, households and housing 29
2002. available at http://www.stat.si/popis2002/en/rezultati/rezultati_red.asp?ter=SLO&st=7 accessed at 7 
March 2018.
 Minority Rights Group, Slovenia available at http://minorityrights.org/minorities/bosniaks-and-muslims/ 30
accessed at 7 March 2018.
 In 2015, 1,046,599 human beings – migrants and refugees – were recorded as entering the EU from Syria 31
and other Middle Eastern and African sources. International Organisation of Migration, ‘Migration Flows - Eu-
rope (Recent Trends)’ March 2016, available at http://migration.iom.int/europe/ accessed 29 March 2016
 ‘Shifting Securities: Television News Cultures Before and After Iraq 2003’, Economic and Social Research 32
Council’s New Security Challenges Programme, ESRC Award RES-223-25-0063, Marie Gillespie, James Gow 
and Andrew Hoskins, Interview 6, Strand C.
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The blend of macro-economic decline, structural disarticulation and demographic pressures 
provided a common context for both the dissolution of Yugoslavia and debates about UK in-
dependence. Allied to nationalist and other political agendas, which drove political debate, in 
both cases, these conditions provided a context in which questions of divorce, separation and 
independence came to the fore. That there are parallel conditions does not mean a common 
fate is predestined. It does, though, serve as pause for thought in considering the prospect of 
a UK exit from the EU. An exaggerated – if perhaps, inevitable – preoccupation with the 
present and the perceived challenges of the moment might obscure sounder, long-term ap-
preciation of interests and values. Certainly, it can have a distorting – though unknown and 
unpredictable, in detail – impact on the course of political interaction between countries, es-
pecially where their common future is in question. Such situations can gain an uncontrollable 
dynamic of their own – as we consider in the following section on the assertion of sovereign-
ties. 
Sovereignty 
Finally, and most important, sovereignty was a central theme in both instances. The word 
was one of the most powerful and most used in each context. The concept connotes supreme 
authority — the right to make decisions and, crucially, the right not to be told what to do by 
others.  It is a term that should not be confused with notions of power, or substantive state33 -
hood, or other practical and political qualities of statehood — although this all too often hap-
pens.  
In the case of Brexit, the term dominated the referendum and pro-independence discourse.  34
 See, for example, Michael Akehurst, London: Allen and Lynch, 1970. See also: F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 33
2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986; Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: the Basis of In-
ternational Society, London: Allen and Unwin, 1986; James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; Sohail Hashmi ed. Sovereignty: Change and Persistence in 
International Relations, University Park, PA: Philadelphia University Press, 1997; James Crawford, Brownlie’s 
rinciples of Public International Law, 8th ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012;  James Gow, 
Defending the West, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005, pp.40-43.
 The Daily Telegraph, 8 June 2016; Michael Gordon, ’Brexit Means Brexit’ - But What Does Brexit Mean? 34
King's Law Journal Volume 27, Issue 3, 2016 
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As one highly respected think-tank put it, sovereignty lay ‘at the heart’ of the matter.  One 35
of the key tropes in the Eurosceptic argument was the need to ‘return’ sovereignty from 
Brussels to Parliament in London (although, ironically, in the post-referendum period, those 
managing the exit process, such as David Davis, Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union, who were keen to avoid allowing parliament a say on the actual Brexit details them-
selves ). It did not matter that that the use of ‘sovereignty’ showed little understanding, 36
whether of the concept itself, or its theoretical position in the UK-EU relationship. That the 
theoretical — and also formal and legal — position was that the UK parliament ‘remained 
sovereign throughout the membership of the EU’, as the Government’s White Paper on Brex-
it stipulated (adding, to appease those of possibly lesser sophistication or promoters of UK 
‘independence’) that it had, perhaps, not always ‘felt like that.’  37
The extent to which sovereignty was central both to Slovenia’s and its opponents arguments 
and to Slovenia’s eventual independence cannot be overstated. This must be emphasised. 
One peer review of this article commented that, ‘almost no one (in Slovenia, in Yugoslavia, 
or internationally) was thinking of the Slovenian republic as a "sovereign state”…’ That is 
utterly wrong, as that was the core theme. In the wake of the military trial of three journalists 
and a non-commissioned officer, behind closed doors, in Serbo-Croat, not Slovene — Slove-
nia leader Milan Kučan openly questioned the non-use of Slovene as an affront to sovereign-
ty, asking how the country (and the language used was always that of the ‘country’ or the 
‘state’ could be ‘sovereign’ if it official business, concerning Slovenian citizens who spoke 
Slovene could not be conducted in the appropriate language.  This same point was revisited 38
in October,  and, again, in November, with a major rally in the heart of Ljubljana on the is39 -
 Robin Niblett, Britain, the EU and the Sovereignty Myth, Research Paper, London: Chatham House, May 35
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to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, Cm. 9417, London: HMSO, February 2017, 
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sue of sovereignty.  As momentum developed over the next year, sovereignty was at the 40
core of debates, which focused on the principles and agreements on which the Yugoslav fed-
eration had been born with the AVNOJ (the Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yu-
goslavia) in 1943,  and which resulted in amendments to the Slovenian constitution in 1989 41
that clarified and reinforced Slovenia’s sovereign status, and its voluntary membership of the 
Yugoslav federation on that basis, as well as the right to self-determination including seces-
sion that emanated from that sovereignty; other amendments delineated economic sovereign-
ty — the sole right to make decisions governing policy in this area in the country — and that, 
effectively, Federal bodies operating in Slovenia should use Slovene as their lingua opeandi, 
as well as two key provisions: that the declaration of a state of emergency on Slovenian soil, 
or the deployment of armed forces, was the sovereign preserve of the Slovenian authorities 
and could only lawfully be decided by them; and removal of the leading role of the commu-
nist party — the end of one party rule, recognising and opening the way to pluralist 
politics.  The withdrawal of the Yugoslav People’s Army from Slovenia on the 25th of Octo42 -
ber 1991 is commemorated annually with a public holiday called ‘Sovereignty Day’. Finally, 
and partly reinforcing the broad parallel with the EU (the less integrated EC, as it then was), 
Slovenia and Croatia jointly proposed a new Yugoslav ‘confederation’ that would be clearly 
based on the sovereignty of the states (and, lest there be doubt, the language used was always 
that of the state, recognising the very nature of the political arrangements built from 
AVNOJ), and re-model the Yugoslav union and its institutions using the terms and organisa-
tion of the EC.  43
Slovenia was not alone in asserting sovereignty. Against the background of compound crisis, 
the Yugoslav member states increasingly asserted their sovereignty. Indeed, it was Serbia that 
acted first to press its authority and openly question constraints on its sovereignty and start to 
 Teleks, 24 November 1988.40
 Janko Pleterski, ‘Kaj je Avnojska Jugoslavija?’, Naša Obramba, October 1989.41
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assert it. In 1986, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences produced a ‘Memorandum’ that 
questioned the constitutional arrangements of the SFRY.  It suggested that Serbia and the Serbs 44
were the victims of existing political arrangements and that Serbia had suffered discrimination 
within the union, especially in relation to the more prosperous republics of Croatia and 
Slovenia and by being the only state to have autonomous provinces  (Vojvodina in the north 
and Kosovo, with a predominantly ethnic-Albanian population, in the south) compromising 
its sovereignty. Although the Memorandum was not officially published at the time, it began to 
create unease among non-Serbs and in republics other than Serbia. By March 1989, the dynamic 
— fuelled by Serbian protests regarding Kosovo — was such that Belgrade asserted its sover-
eignty in constitutional amendments that stripped the autonomous provinces of any meaningful 
autonomy, all the more so, as Kosovo was placed under martial law.  45
Other members of the federation reacted to the Serbian assertion of sovereignty, beginning a 
cycle of assertion and counter-assertion. Political leaders in the other states bolstered com-
mitment to their own republics’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. Each member state 
sought to secure its own destiny, pursuing its own agendas. These were defensive reactions 
to rising Serbian militancy, for the most part. The assertion of sovereignty engendered antag-
onistic counter-assertion. There was undoubtedly some sense of self-protection, in each in-
stance. In the critical Yugoslav context, the confederal promoters, seeking less centralisation 
and weaker integration of he union, saw the federation as Serbian-dominated and centralis-
ing; federalists saw greater integration and tighter central control as necessary to preservation 
of the union. Confederation was a code for dismembering Yugoslavia, in the view of the fed-
eralists. While the ‘confederates’ saw it as the means to retain a common framework. In the 
end, these were mutually exclusive positions and the acutely differing perspectives also re-
vealed, ultimately, the absence of commitment to, and faith in, the joint project — and, of 
course, dissolution of the federation. 
 Neither the draft memorandum, nor its final version in 1987 were published officially at the time; the 1986 44
draft was widely circulated and eventually published unofficially, however, in Croatia by Naše Teme, Vol.33, 
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vić and to the break-up of the Yugoslav federation.
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While the EU context was not so sharply polarised, it was clear that the UK was one of sev-
eral countries arguing against ‘ever deeper union’ and also for reform of the Union itself. De-
signs to bond the Union ever more tightly met with reluctance and opposition from those 
who lacked faith in the EU. The push to greater union provoked the pushback of cares about 
sovereignty. 
In both the Slovenia and British, states pursuing what they perceive to be their interests as-
serted sovereignty within and against a union of which they formed a part. That assertion of 
sovereignty, however, produced counter-assertions. The mutual spiral of assertion and 
counter-assertion very quickly took on a dynamic of its own, largely because, as action begat 
reaction, emotions grew and those being ‘left’ felt the pain and hurt of rejection.  
A dynamic was created in which the states involved might not necessarily be able fully to 
appreciate, or control, their own positions, as others’ perceptions of them and their own per-
ceptions of others became caught up in an escalatory vortex. In these processes, that which 
was intended initially may become lost, as event leads to event and statement to statement, 
until unintended and possibly unwelcome outcomes emerge, as the actors are locked in ar-
gument. The argument takes on its own logic, with unknown outcomes to the argument and 
i n d i s c e r n i b l e e f f e c t s b e y o n d i t . 
We attempt to assess these issues of impact and effect in the following, final, section of the 
article. 
Sloexit: Impact and Effect 
Inevitably in the Yugoslav context, the armed conflict that accompanied the break-up was the 
biggest impact on all the countries. However, Slovenia stood apart from the others. Despite 
experiencing a short period of armed conflict – the so-called Ten Day War – the country was 
quickly clear of the direct effects of warfare. Its independence, therefore, was not very com-
promised by armed conflict and so the economic and social impact of independence can be 
reasonably gauged, which is what we do in the present section. 
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Slovenia experienced severe economic contraction and depression, linked to the break with 
the Yugoslav federation and its impact on the economy. Indeed, Slovenia’s experience of 
economic decentralisation and market features in the 1980s meant that, as one well-placed 
analyst concluded, ‘the necessity of rapid restructuring was produced more by the secession 
and ensuing collapse of Yugoslavia than by the transition itself.’  The events of 1991 forced 46
production down by 9.3 per cent, and in 1992 there was a further fall of 6 per cent.  Along 47
with this, as noted above, there was large growth in unemployment, adding to public spend-
ing. 
The most obvious impact of the Yugoslav dissolution was in trade. Slovenia had not been 
dependent on ‘cheap’ raw materials from other Yugoslav republics—contrary to most as-
sumptions.  However, a significant part of its manufacturing output had been sold into the 48
Yugoslav market, particularly to Croatia. Nonetheless, from 1993, overall recovery began 
and Germany and Italy accounted for the largest individual shares of trade, by 1997.  By 49
that year, trade had been re-oriented, with a significant increase regarding member states of 
the EU. This had already accounted for two-fifths of exports at the end of the Yugoslav peri-
od, but had risen to nearly two-thirds.  There was also strong trading with the states of 50
CEFTA, the Central European Free Trade Association. Slovenia had restored itself as a suc-
cessful exporter, after several years and albeit some way short of former levels. 
Despite the strong recovery, there was a long-term significant impact on certain businesses, 
which were closely tied to coordinated production and sale in the Yugoslav federation. For 
 Mencinger, ‘Costs and Benefits’, p.211.46
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example, the TAM engineering factory in Slovenia was integrated into production in the 
common Yugoslav market – activity, which was halted because of independence and the out-
break of armed conflict. The company went into liquidation and was reconstituted with only 
2,000 of its previous 8,800-strong workforce and a narrow focus on the production of 
buses.  In 1996, TAM collapsed when that activity could not be sustained in face of global 51
competition.  Thus, independence caused economic casualties in specific areas. 52
The break with Yugoslavia affected Slovenia’s relations with international financial institu-
tions. Aside from the need to establish links between the newly independent country and 
these bodies, and Slovenia’s unresolved debt, the country was adversely shaped by percep-
tions of uncertainty and instability, including the sense that the government lacked the confi-
dence of its own population.  Securing investment was problematic, as potential business 53
partners did not want to take risks. This impact was clearly shown in the tourist industry, a 
major source of external income prior to independence. Foreign tourism was almost wiped 
out for a period, dropping from 1,095,000 (50 per cent of the country’s own population size, 
approximately) to 299,000, in 1991, and almost no activity in 1992. In part, this could be ex-
plained by the armed conflict in Croatia and in Bosnia, as a significant part of Slovenian 
tourism involved Germans and Austrians in transit to the Dalmatian coast in Croatia – and 
with war there, they were not travelling – an observation supported by post-1996 (and so 
post-armed conflict) earnings of $1.22 billion, which, although some way short of pre-inde-
pendence levels, confirmed good prospects for recovery.  But, there had been a significant 54
cost to leaving the Yugoslav union and securing independence. 
There were, then, three main – and negative – impacts on Slovenia economically, as it be-
came independent, The first of these was a sharp economic decline, with an almost ten per 
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cent drop in productivity in the first year, compounded by further drops, or nil growth in sub-
sequent years, before the economy began to pick up almost a decade later. The second major 
impact was a significant decline in trade and industry, with businesses enmeshed in the union 
finding their integrated activity curtailed, or badly affected, leading to restructuring, losses 
and closures – as well as prompting the ineluctable concomitant of lost trade, rising unem-
ployment, in what had been a prosperous full-employment economy. The final economic ef-
fect was the perceived uncertainty and insecurity that accompanied Slovenia’s independence, 
making international loans and credit difficult to secure, despite an economy that had under-
lying strength, and inhibiting foreign direct investment. 
The effects of independence on Slovenia, economically the strongest of the Yugoslav states 
and the first to push for independence, were not, however, wholly negative. They were 
mixed. There was a significant economic contraction, collapse in trade and a lack of external 
investment, which was the result of perceived instability and uncertainty. However, against 
this, the economy picked up, a decade on – albeit, spurred by the prospective security of 
joining another union, the larger European one. Without doubt, Slovenia’s economic restruc-
turing, which was largely successful, occurred far more rapidly that would have been possi-
ble had it remained joined to the other Yugoslav states. 
Of course, it has to be noted that Slovenia survived independence and, until the 2007-2008 
global financial crisis, prospered. Over time, growth returned and uncertainty gave way to 
perceptions of a safe and stable – if small – economy. However, a major factor in both stabil-
isation and growth was the prospect that Slovenia would join the EU at some point, as it did, 
in 2004. On the positive side, Slovenia had sought independence to ensure its own economic 
reform and programme, and, notwithstanding the post-2007 global downturn (and also gov-
ernment decisions that may have undermined the economy since ), the balance sheet overall 55
suggested more of a positive, than negative, outcome, ultimately. However, there were sig-
nificant costs along the way. Transition was made more difficult by the need to negotiate the 
 Jože P. Damijan, ‘What went wrong in Slovenia?’ Die Presse 8 September 2012, available in English at on 55
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March 2016.
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difficulties caused by the break-up of Yugoslavia. 
Comparative Reflection on Sloexit and Brexit 
What can be taken from the Yugoslav break-up – and Slovenia’s experience of independence, 
in particular – for the UK-EU question? As noted initially, there are key differences that set 
the cases apart, but there are some parallels, as discussed in the previous two sections, that 
mean that something can be gauged from assessing the impact of independence on Slovenia 
– again, noting that the other Yugoslav states and the effects of war they suffered, offer no 
reasonable basis for comparison – except, from the warning that once unraveling is begun, 
where it will end cannot be known for sure, and that this uncertainty also carries with it the 
risk of armed conflict. However, setting that aside, a focus on Slovenia can yield instructive 
counsel.  
Reflection on Sloexit can inform consideration of the ‘Brexit’ question, notwithstanding the 
inevitable dissimilarities between the cases. The history of states seeking – and gaining – in-
dependence from a union of sovereign states, where sovereign rights in some areas had been 
transferred to that union and where decision making was inter-governmental provides a 
patent point of reference for considering the UK-EU independence issue – even though there 
are limiting factors, as we note in the discussion above. As a point of departure for reflection 
on the prospect of Britain’ leaving the EU, it offers comparative insight in terms of the condi-
tions and context affecting it, the dynamics of sovereignty assertion and the impact and ef-
fects of independence gained. 
In terms of the first of these, compound crisis critically challenging the legitimacy of the 
union provides the conditions that make discussion of independence serious.  The economic 56
crisis that hit the EU after 2007, augmenting structural differences between the economies of 
the southern member states and those of the north parallel the same patterns among the Yu-
goslav states, which experienced economic collapse, largely as a result of external factors, in 
1980s. The combination of economic collapse, structural disjuncture and pressures of demo-
 On the notion of ‘critical legitimacy’ see Ernst Dijxhoorn, Quasi-states, Critical Legitimacy and In56 -
ternational Criminal Courts New York: Routledge, 2017.
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graphic change and migration in the two inter-governmental frameworks and the different 
periods mirror each other. They give very similar contexts both to the dissolution of Yu-
goslavia and to discussion surrounding Britain’s leaving the EU. Parallel conditions do not, 
however, preordain the outcome of the latter. They do urge consideration of wider and com-
plex questions about interests and values than can be lost with a focus on more immediate, 
but passing matters, such as migration. The short-term focus on particular pressures can dis-
tort discussion and lead to possibly uncontrollable dynamics in the relations between states. 
The Slovenian example demonstrates strongly the way in which actions prompt reactions and 
lock parties into a particular trajectory. The evidence of the Yugoslav break-up, setting aside 
the detail, tussles over greater union and retention of sovereignty, or assertions of sovereignty 
that reap counter-assertions of sovereignty is that one actors’ seeking independence can cause 
responses and generate circumstances that are uncertain and can lead into unforeseeable wa-
ters, more likely than not, with adverse effect. In such situations, the logic of argument takes 
over and binds those arguing into a course of events they cease to control. This means that 
outcomes will be unknown and the effects on the actors themselves will be unpredictable. 
In the final analysis, reflecting on the parallels between the Yugoslav dissolution and the UK 
independence question, it is possible to observe that Slovenia’s independence was surviv-
able, but that it came at a price – a fairly significant cost in terms of its own economy and, 
perhaps, the armed conflict to which the logic of independence led its erstwhile partners. As 
shown above, there were three major negative impacts caused by Sloexit: sharp economic 
decline; a significant decline in trade and industry, particularly affecting businesses signifi-
cantly active in the union, leading to restructuring, losses and closures; and, last, perceived 
uncertainty and insecurity, making international loans and credit difficult to secure, and in-
hibiting foreign direct investment. These were effects that, mutatis mutandis, might well be 
expected to hit the UK, in one way, or another.  
States – even the largest and most powerful – need stable security environments and open-
ness in the twenty-first century – as the 2015 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review and 
National Security Strategy (SDSR) exemplified. And, as a final coda, echoing off the radar of 
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the warning of resurgent Russia in the SDSR, it is notable that Moscow was the only major 
actor not to be pushing the UK to remain in the EU. The break-up of Yugoslavia was only 
possible because the Cold War had ended and the threat from Moscow that previously disci-
plined the Yugoslav states to maintain their union had gone. It is quite possible that if the 
threat from Russia were clearly grasped, the EU and its member states would be similarly 
disciplined to keep partnerships and display coherence. In its own worldview, no doubt, 
Moscow will benefit far more from European disunion and UK independence that even the 
most ardent proponents of ‘Brexit’ believe the UK could, which is why Russia softly sup-
ported that campaign . 57
Conclusion 
Slovenia was relatively lucky in exiting Yugoslavia. There was certainly a price to be paid, as 
the negative effects on the economy proved. Yet, for Slovenia, independence was survivable 
and also allowed economic restructuring to enable a more modern economy. Slovenia’s luck 
was not, of course, matched by the other Yugoslav states, who, one way or another, suffered 
from armed hostilities for a decade after dissolution. Indeed, while many in Slovenia are 
probably comfortable with the country’s progress and accession to the EU (though by no 
means all, with large segments of the population exhibiting versions of Euroscepticism), they 
must also be haunted by the ghosts of the armed conflict that came, in some sense, as a con-
sequence of their country’s quest to exercise the full set of sovereign rights to be masters of 
their fate. No one (or almost no one) could foresee the kind of armed conflict that would fol-
low and accompany the break-up of Yugoslavia. At the time, many did not believe that a 
break-up would, or could (let alone, should) occur – and almost everyone believed that, 
whatever happened in terms of sovereignty debates, another war would be impossible, given 
the memories still present of the awful suffering of the Second World War in these lands. 
Both occurred. It is even more unlikely – unthinkable – that a fracturing of the EU would 
lead to armed hostilities among the member states. Yet, a warning from the Yugoslav experi-
 This included covert measures, as detailed in the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee 57
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Committee on Foreign Relations, 2018.
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ence might be to consider the way in which the dynamic of batting claims to sovereignty 
back and forth can create a Frankenstein’s Monster with a life of its own. 
This is, of course, not at all dissimilar to the phenomenon of married couples, or other forms 
of partnership, as Sir Paul Coleridge indicated, in which one party, for whatever reason, de-
cides that it is time to part ways, and the other – however much this other might recognise 
rationally that the split makes some sense – reacts emotionally to being left and abandoned. 
It is a caution, in the context of discussion about the UK’s leaving the EU, to keep in mind 
that, whatever rational evidence or the belief that rationally, whatever the evidence, things 
will remain the same, the evidence of separations is that they are hard and that being rejected 
by being ‘left’ almost inevitably creates resentments, even where there is good will. That 
means that, even where it might be possible hypothetically rationally to say a situation would 
be exactly the same irrespective of whether a state were inside or outside a union, the messy 
reality is that emotions and prejudices – including the hurt of being left – will get in the way. 
And, as the research with formerly married couples with which we began shows, they may 
wish they had remained in union five years on – and Slovenia’s experience was to join an-
other union as soon as it could, which is the almost inevitable fate of all states that are open, 
trading, financially interdependent (and socially transnational) who seek economic prosperity 
and the stability such prosperity requires in the twenty-first century.
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